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By Democratic Audit UK
Between cohesion and division: reconciling the faultines of
Europe’s past
Despite movement towards integration in the form of a shared currency and political institutions over the last 20
years, Europe shows signs of slipping back into populism and rancour. But do the faultlines of Europe’s past make
full reconciliation impossible? Giacomo Lichtner, Mark Seymour, Maartja Abbenhuis  explore this possibility,
arguing that doing so is a necessity if the continent’s functional cohesion, anduniquely social-democratic vision,
are to be sustained into the future.
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For all our cherished empiricism, historians have a decidedly metaphysical task: to reject linear readings of the
past, to warn against simplistic consequentiality, and yet – all the while – to impress a narrative onto history. Our
discipline thrives on complexity and yet dreams of simplicity, employing ‘periodisation’, individualisation and
causality as readily as it dismisses them. Should we beware, then, of the historian tempted by topical
commentary? Maybe. Yet how can we be blamed, when History is exploited so effectively in politics, employed so
callously in nation-building (and un-building), wheeled out so unscrupulously to justify just about everything?
From the centenary of the First World War to the re-emergence of xenophobic populisms in Greece or France, the
UK or Greece, Norway or Italy, the examples are everywhere: we – historians watching Europe from the Antipodes
and from the vantage points of our own stories of migration and displacement – would like to suggest that the best
way to understand Europe’s life-threatening challenges is not in forced discourses of historical cohesion and
economic cycles, but an analysis of historical ‘faultlines’. These faultlines – as reliably unreliable as their
geological counterparts – were the focus of the biennial conference of the Australasian Association for European
History (AAEH), held in Wellington in 2013, and of the latest special issue of the Australian Journal of Politics and
History on ‘cohesion and division in Modern Europe’, which we edited with our colleague Simone Gigliotti.
A century ago, the early stages of the First World War marked the beginning of a new era of European experience.
For more than three decades after the July crisis of 1914, the continent was torn apart by wars, revolutions,
political upheavals and depressions. To contemporaries it seemed that the nineteenth-century age of relative
peace and limited war had passed for good. After the conclusion of the Second World War, European integration
and the strengthening of Europe’s identity as a geopolitical unit were above all responses to the barbarity of the
preceding war-torn decades.
By the early twenty-first century, with the iron curtain drawn fully back and the introduction of the single currency
achieved, the European post-war project seemed well on the way to “healing history’s deep scars”, and there was
considerable reason for optimism as Europe became the global economy’s largest trading bloc. Only a few years
later the picture in Europe is very different: the continent is beset by major problems and burdened by anxieties.
Some of these, including the viability of the single-currency Union, flow from 2008’s Global Financial Crisis. Others
attest to rising populism and skepticism towards Europe’s supra-national experiment. Many are fearful of the
impact of war in the Ukraine and the spread of Russia’s influence. The postwar narrative of European cohesion
struggles to find its next chapter.
The situation unfolding in Europe since 2008 is clearly the main purview of economists and political scientists, yet
presentist analyses of Europe’s multiple concurrent crises are not sufficient. With riots in Greece over austerity
measures, economic paralysis and hardship in Spain, Portugal, Italy and Ireland caused by unmanageable
sovereign debts, and tensions generated by the accession of eastern European states to the Union, old faultlines
— economic, political, and social — threaten Europe anew.
Some of these are cardinal ones of north-south, east-west, and centre-periphery — all lines of division that
European integration assiduously sought to diminish — but they have been exacerbated in the present by the
changing dynamics of a global economy, complex new migration flows, and new meanings emerging from old
memories. As historians, we look at these threatening tectonic shifts in Europe’s geopolitics and see the
opportunity for fresh and more nuanced reflection on past lines of division, as well as areas of cohesion, in
Europe’s modern history. Europe’s recent past is revealing both old and new faultlines, some of which had
effectively been veiled by discursive regimes emphasising European cohesion.
Such discourses, epitomized by rhetoric surrounding the introduction of the Euro currency in 2002 and supported
by a period of economic optimism, had reigned supreme during the early years of the twenty-first century. The
GFC sharply ended their hegemony, and the future of Europe suddenly began to look deeply uncertain. Although
the president of the European Commission, José Manuel Barroso, may justifiably have declared in his 2013 State
of the Union address to the European Parliament that the enlargement of Europe had healed history’s deep scars,
the continent’s institutional relationship with those memories clearly risks being as shallow as Peter Novick’s
provocative commandment never to forget ‘the massacre of the Albigensians’.
What is the point of ‘healing’ a traumatic past if one does learn to recognise and offset the same fundamental
tensions as they re-emerge? And Europe’s old wounds indeed remain visible, as they threaten to re-open, now
along well-marked lines, now in jagged new ways. The same faultlines of ethnic and class politics – allegedly
recomposed by European integration and the defeat of Communism – now shake both the familiar rhetoric linking
Germany’s current economic hegemony to its Nazi past, and the more unexpected flirtation between Europe’s
right-wing populist xenophobes and Putin’s Russia, for instance.
As we did with the 2013 AAEH conference, therefore, we continue to invite scholars to reconsider Europe’s history
in the light of this very different atmosphere and environment. Although historians are in the business of looking
backwards rather than forwards, and are wary of letting the choppy texture of the present unduly influence their
interpretations of the past, the prospects of the contemporary age inevitably colour the way the past looks at a
given moment. The only moment that really matters, after all, is the one we inhabit right now.
But more than ever, in this fragile present, dispassionate commitment to the never-ending task of reconciling the
faultines of the past – national, regional, ethnic, social class, and so on – is essential if Europe’s functional
cohesion, and its uniquely social-democratic vision, are to be sustained into the future.
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